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Several studies suggest that referential choices are influenced by animacy. On the one
hand, animate referents are more likely to be mentioned as subjects than inanimate ref-
erents. On the other hand, animate referents are more frequently pronominalized than
inanimate referents. These effects have been analyzed as effects of conceptual accessi-
bility. In this paper, we raise the question whether these effects are driven only by lexical
concepts, such that referents described by animate lexical items (e.g., “toddler”) are more
accessible than referents described by inanimate lexical items (e.g., “shoe”), or can also
be influenced by context-derived conceptualizations, such that referents that are perceived
as animate in a particular context are more accessible than referents that are not. In two
animation-retelling experiments, conducted in Dutch, we investigated the influence of lexi-
cal and perceptual animacy on the choice of referent and the choice of referring expression.
If the effects of animacy are context-dependent, entities that are perceived as animate
should yield more subject references and more pronouns than entities that are perceived
as inanimate, irrespective of their lexical animacy. If the effects are tied to lexical con-
cepts, entities described with animate lexical items should be mentioned as the subject
and pronominalized more frequently than entities described with inanimate lexical items,
irrespective of their perceptual animacy. The results show that while only lexical animacy
appears to affect the choice of subject referent, perceptual animacy may overrule lexical ani-
macy in the choice of referring expression. These findings suggest that referential choices
can be influenced by conceptualizations based on the perceptual context.
Keywords: perceptual animacy, lexical animacy, referring expressions, conceptual accessibility, story retelling,
Dutch
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the languages of the world, the influence of animacy
turns up in numerous linguistic choices. For example, animate
entities are more likely to be chosen as the subject or the topic
of a sentence than inanimate entities (e.g., Givón, 1983; Dahl and
Fraurud, 1996), and they also typically occur earlier in the sentence
(e.g., Branigan and Feleki, 1999). The tendency to place animate
entities early in the sentence also leads to animacy effects in the
choice between alternating grammatical structures. For example,
passive sentences are more frequent when the patient role is taken
up by an animate entity (McDonald et al., 1993;Van Nice and Diet-
rich, 2003a). This is illustrated by the preference in English for the
sentence in (1a) over the one in (1b) (Prat-Sala and Branigan,
2000).
(1a) The woman was run over by the train.
(1b) The train ran over the woman.
In addition, there is evidence that animacy affects the choice
of referring expressions: animate entities have been found to be
more often referred to with pronouns than inanimate entities
(Dahl and Fraurud, 1996; Yamamoto, 1999; Fukumura and van
Gompel, 2011). For example, Fukumura and van Gompel (2011)
found in a story completion experiment that speakers were more
likely to pronominalize the animate entity (“the hikers”) than the
inanimate entity (“the canoes”) in (2a). The same held when gram-
matical roles were reversed, such as in (2b), suggesting that the
effect of animacy on pronominalization is independent of gram-
matical function. They also found that animacy affected the choice
of referent: participants were more likely to refer to the animate
NP than to the inanimate NP in their continuations.
(2a) The hikers carried the canoes downstream. Sometimes. . .
(2b) The canoes carried the hikers downstream. Sometimes. . .
Thus, animacy appears to influence referential choices: on the
one hand, it affects which referent is chosen as the subject of the
sentence or as the first-mentioned entity. On the other hand, it
affects the type of referring expression that is used to refer to
an entity, e.g., a pronoun (“she”) or a full noun phrase (“the
girl”). These effects are generally explained as effects of concep-
tual accessibility (Bock and Warren, 1985): mental representations
of animate entities are more easily retrieved from memory than
representations of inanimate entities. Therefore, they are available
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early for linguistic processing (e.g., Prat-Sala and Branigan, 2000),
and need less linguistic encoding (Fukumura and van Gompel,
2011). However, it is less clear what the source of these effects is.
It could be the case that they arise from the accessibility of lexical
concepts (e.g., Branigan et al., 2008), such that the representations
associated with animate nouns in the mental lexicon (e.g., “tod-
dler”) are more accessible than those associated with inanimate
nouns (e.g., “shoe”). Alternatively, the effects of animacy could
be driven by the accessibility of non-linguistic conceptual repre-
sentations, which may be influenced by the (perceptual) context
(e.g., Bock and Warren, 1985; Arnold, 2010). For example, entities
that move in a (seemingly) meaningful way may be conceptualized
as more animate, and therefore be more accessible. In this paper,
we investigate the interplay between a referent’s animacy based
on the associated lexical concept (lexical animacy) and the degree
to which it is conceptualized as animate or inanimate based on
motion cues (perceptual animacy) in referential choices. We inves-
tigate effects on both referent choice (which entity is referred to as
the subject), and choice of referring expression (whether the entity
is referred to with a pronoun or a full noun phrase) in Dutch.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Although strictly speaking the term “animacy” refers to the degree
to which something is alive, animacy is not a property of entities
in the world. Rather, it is a property of people’s cognitive repre-
sentations of entities, which result from the way people mentally
classify entities in the world as “animate” or “inanimate” (a cogni-
tive ontology, Fraurud, 1996). Therefore, this classification differs
from a strictly biological sense of “livingness.” For example, in the
animacy hierarchy given in (3) (e.g., Comrie, 1989), humans are
treated as more animate than animals, although they are not more
“alive” in a biological sense.
(3) Animacy hierarchy
Human>Animate> Inanimate
In addition, the way animacy has been found to affect linguistic
structure shows that animacy can be a more gradient factor than
suggested by the hierarchy in (3). For example, entities such as
machines and vehicles, or collectives such as companies and orga-
nizations, are treated linguistically as more animate than objects
like books and tables (e.g., Comrie, 1989; Dabrowska, 1998; Rosen-
bach, 2008). Thus, what counts as more animate or inanimate is
not so much dependent on properties intrinsic to entities, but on
how we conceptualize these entities.
In early transformational grammar (e.g., Katz, 1972), animacy
was formalized as a semantic feature tied to an entity’s lexical item.
A feature that did not match the selection restrictions evoked by
the predicate would result in an anomaly. Hence, the sentence in
(4) would be anomalous, since “chase” takes an animate subject,
while “tree” does not have the feature “animate.”
(4) ∗The tree chased the fly.
Although the anomaly might be resolved in certain contexts,
the structure in itself remains ungrammatical under this account.
Thus, animacy is regarded here as closely tied to the lexicon. More
recently, many (psycho)linguistic studies on animacy also treat the
conceptualization of entities only implicitly, presupposing an ani-
mate representation for an animate lexical item (e.g., “toddler”),
and an inanimate representation for an inanimate lexical item (e.g.,
“shoe”). For example, Prat-Sala and Branigan (2000) assume that
an entity’s animacy contributes to its inherent salience, which is
constant across contexts. In addition, Branigan et al. (2008), while
considering animacy as one of the factors affecting a referent’s
conceptual accessibility, assume that this refers to the accessibil-
ity of lexical concepts, i.e., concepts that are closely connected to a
lexical item.
However, it is clear that people do not always assign the same
degree of animacy to the same (lexical) concepts. Like discourse
salience (e.g., topichood), this is something that can vary with con-
text. Notably, in some contexts people can conceptualize usually
inanimate entities as animate. In cartoons or fairy tales, for exam-
ple, inanimate entities or animals are often anthropomorphized.
This also happens in real-world contexts, as when someone says
“The tree wants to catch me” for a tree with branches sticking
out like arms. The reverse, treating animate entities as inanimate,
is theoretically also possible, although this may be less likely1.
In addition, in figurative language use such as personification,
metaphor, and metonymy, entities are often referred to in a way
that does not match their actual animacy, as in “His ideas will live
on forever” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), or “The ham sandwich
is sitting at table 20” (Nunberg, 1979), to refer to a customer in a
restaurant.
Evidence that there is variation in the way entities are concep-
tualized as animate or inanimate comes from different areas of
research. From linguistic typology we know that languages dif-
fer in which entities are treated as animate or inanimate in the
grammar. A well-known example is that of the Algonquian lan-
guage Fox, in which the word for “strawberry” is grammatically
inanimate, while the word for “raspberry” is animate (Anderson,
1997). Hence, the former cannot occur as the beneficiary role in
ditransitive constructions, while the latter can. Similarly, in Per-
sian, the word for“tree” is lexically classified as animate, by which it
takes the animate plural suffix, while the word for“flower” takes an
inanimate suffix (Wiese, 2003). In addition, in many European lan-
guages inanimate nouns have masculine or feminine gender, which
may affect how they are conceptualized (e.g., Dahl, 2000; Borodit-
sky et al., 2003). There is also evidence that conceptualizations of
animacy may differ across contexts within the same language. In
an ERP-study by Nieuwland and Van Berkum (2006), utterances
that would normally violate animacy requirements, such as “The
peanut was in love,” were found to be easy to process when they
were embedded in a fairy tale or cartoon-like context, in which
inanimate objects were consistently made the subject of predicates
that require an animate subject (e.g., dance). Within such con-
texts, a normally well-formed utterance such as “The peanut was
salted” became more difficult to process. This suggests that people
1One reason why such cases are hard to find may be that there are more linguis-
tic constructions that require animate arguments than there are constructions that
only take inanimate arguments. An example might be the use of animate nouns in
constructions that normally only allow mass nouns, as in “That’s a lot of dog you’ve
got there” (Croft, 1994).
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can easily accommodate to contexts in which normally inanimate
objects are presented as animate, and that these objects are treated
as fully animate from that point on. This makes it clear that the
classification of concepts according to their lexical-semantic ani-
macy should be distinguished from contextually inferred animacy
(cf. Yamamoto, 1999; Rosenbach, 2008).
The conceptualization of entities as more or less animate in ref-
erence may be related to the anthropocentric nature of language,
i.e., people talk about things from their own, human, perspec-
tive. An entity may thus be more animate the more it resembles
humans. The reason for this may be that people have more empa-
thy toward such entities (e.g., Kuno and Kaburaki, 1977), or find
them otherwise more important to talk about (Givón, 1983). Srid-
har (1988), for example, found that when people described an
interaction between a ball and a doll (two inanimate objects), the
doll was more likely to be mentioned first in the sentence. It has
been suggested that the relevant property in conceptualizing ref-
erents is degree of individuation, e.g., whether they appear to be
autonomous beings, have the ability to act upon their environ-
ment, or have goals, intentions, and mental states (Fraurud, 1996;
Dahl, 2008). An important factor in classifying an entity as an indi-
vidual is how it is perceived. For example, individuals typically
exist in their own right (they are not physically part of another
entity), they move without the intervention of an external force,
and they act in meaningful ways. Hence, a clear perceptual cue
for animacy or individuation is motion. According to the percep-
tion literature, movements of simple geometric objects can indeed
induce a strong and immediate percept of animacy (e.g., Scholl and
Tremoulet, 2000). In an early study by Heider and Simmel (1944),
participants were found to readily assign emotions and intentions
to geometric objects when they moved in non-random ways. More
recent work shows that even very subtle movement cues can still
create a perception of animacy. For example, a sudden change in
speed or direction already leads to animate percepts (Tremoulet
and Feldman, 2000). In addition, when the movements of two
objects are correlated or one moving object pauses near another
object, this creates a suggestion of animacy (Schultz et al., 2005;
Santos et al., 2008).
Applied to normally inanimate entities, such perceptual motion
cues may cause them to be conceived of as more animate and more
individuated, which may make them more conceptually accessible.
According to the theory of conceptual accessibility (Bock and War-
ren, 1985), the activation of mental representations of referents in
memory is fed by both perception and conceptual knowledge.
Indeed, Bock et al. (1992) and McDonald et al. (1993) found that
animacy effects on word order were enhanced when participants
created a mental image of the entities. Similarly, in the Nieuw-
land and Van Berkum (2006) study most participants reported to
have visualized the story and to have seen the inanimate objects as
cartoon-like characters with human characteristics such as a face,
arms, and legs. This suggests that context-dependent perceptual
information, such as motion, can contribute to a referent’s concep-
tual accessibility,on top of conceptual information from long-term
memory. Prat-Sala and Branigan (2000) distinguish two types of
accessibility: inherent accessibility, which concerns properties of
a referent that remain stable across contexts, and derived acces-
sibility, which concerns the salience of a referent in the linguistic
or non-linguistic context. Factors influencing inherent accessibil-
ity typically include lexical animacy (e.g., Prat-Sala and Branigan,
2000) and concreteness (Maes, 1997), while derived accessibility
is typically affected by factors such as givenness (e.g., Ferreira and
Yoshita, 2003) and thematic role (Van Nice and Dietrich, 2003b).
Since perceptual motion cues for animacy may change across
contexts, and are not intrinsic to the entity itself, we may add
perceptual animacy as a factor contributing to derived accessibility.
In Prat-Sala and Branigan’s (2000) view, a referent’s overall
conceptual accessibility is a combination of its inherent and its
derived accessibility. They also argued, on the basis of a picture
description experiment, that in strong enough contexts, derived
accessibility might override effects of inherent accessibility. Hence,
a lexically animate entity is more likely to be mentioned in sub-
ject position than an inanimate entity, unless the discourse makes
the inanimate entity salient enough to overcome the difference
in inherent accessibility. Additional evidence that derived acces-
sibility may override inherent accessibility has been found, e.g.,
by Christianson and Ferreira (2005) and Van Nice and Dietrich
(2003b). This is also consistent with the findings of Nieuwland
and Van Berkum (2006), who found that the lexical meaning of
“peanut”was overruled by the pragmatic inference of the referent’s
animacy due to the discourse context. On the other hand, other
studies have not found evidence for the dominance of one type
of accessibility over the other (e.g., Van Nice and Dietrich, 2003b;
Fukumura and van Gompel, 2011).
The question we ask in this paper is how lexical-semantic ani-
macy and contextually driven animacy interact in determining ref-
erential choices in language production. To address this question,
the present study investigates the interplay between the animacy
associated with lexical concepts (henceforth lexical animacy), and
the perceived animacy based on the referent’s movements (hence-
forth perceptual animacy) in Dutch spoken language production.
That is, we investigate whether lexically inanimate referents that
are conceptualized as animate and lexically animate referents that
are conceptualized as inanimate are different from the congru-
ent cases with respect to referential choices. We examine both the
choice of referent (which entity is referred to as the subject) and
the choice of referring expression (use of pronouns and full noun
phrases).
One possible hypothesis is that lexical and perceptual cues
for animacy both affect the conceptual accessibility of a refer-
ent, but that perceptual animacy overrules lexical animacy, in line
with Nieuwland and Van Berkum (2006). Hence, animate mov-
ing objects should be more likely to be referred to as subjects
and with pronouns than inanimate moving objects, irrespective of
lexical animacy. Only when the entity is perceptually inanimate,
lexical animacy is expected to have an effect, since conceptualizing
animate entities as inanimate may be less straightforward.
Alternatively, lexical and perceptual animacy may affect acces-
sibility independently. In this case, a referent’s accessibility is pre-
dicted to be highest when the entity is both mentioned using an
animate lexical description and perceived as animate. It should
be lowest when the referent is both lexically and perceptually
inanimate. In the incongruent cases, i.e., lexically animate but per-
ceptually inanimate or vice versa, accessibility is predicted to be
intermediate. Assuming that both the rate of pronominalization
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and the likelihood of being mentioned as the subject increase pro-
portionally with an increase in accessibility, pronouns, and subject
references are predicted to be most frequent in cases where all cues
point to a high degree of animacy, to be least frequent in cases
where all cues point to a low degree of animacy, and somewhere
in between for the incongruent cases. If conceptualizing lexically
inanimate objects as animate is easier than conceptualizing lexi-
cally animate objects as inanimate, the effect of perceptual animacy
should be at least present in the lexically inanimate condition.
We conducted two experiments, in which participants watched
animations of simple geometric objects, such as circles and tri-
angles, and retold them afterward. We used retelling from mem-
ory rather than speaking when the animations were still in view
because we believed this would be the more natural communica-
tive situation (cf. Christianson and Ferreira, 2005). The perceptual
animacy of the objects in the animations was manipulated by using
movement cues to create animate and inanimate conceptualiza-
tions. Manipulating motion allowed us to make use of the exact
same objects in the animate and in the inanimate conceptualiza-
tions. In this way, the appearance of the referent was kept constant
across all conditions, such that it could not influence the referent’s
perceptual or lexical animacy. In addition, we separated lexical
animacy from perceptual animacy by giving lexical labels to the
objects. In Experiment 1, the lexical labels were animate and inani-
mate nouns that either matched or did not match in animacy with
the movements. In Experiment 2, we replaced the lexical labels
with nonsense words that could be interpreted as either referring
to animate or referring to inanimate entities, to exclude a possible
influence of lexical animacy on perceptual animacy.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixty-four students from Tilburg University participated in this
experiment for course credit. All were native speakers of Dutch.
All participants gave their consent to the use of their data.
Materials
We created 16 different animations, using the motion paths from
the custom animation function in Microsoft PowerPoint. Each
animation featured three geometric objects, of which one was the
target figure and the two others were competitors. The objects
were selected from the following built-in shapes in Powerpoint:
cross, oval, rectangle, isosceles triangle, up arrow, and diamond.
All had the same dimensions. The two competitor objects both
had the same shape, which was always different from the target
figure’s shape. The figures appeared in one of four colors: white,
light green, light blue, or light purple. Within one animation, col-
ors of the target and the competitors were always the same. Shapes
and colors were assigned randomly to the animations, except for
animations involving rolling or bouncing movements, in which
the target object was always a circle. Eight animations contained
animate motion of the target figure, and the other eight contained
inanimate motion of the target figure (to be explained below).
The animate and inanimate animations were paired, such that for
each animate animation there was another animation featuring the
same objects but in which the target figure moved in an inanimate
way. An example of an animate stimulus item is given in Figure 1.
The animations were presented on a black background, but some
animations included the suggestion of a landscape, presented by
a white continuous line (as in Figure 1). This was done to aid
the interpretation of some movements (e.g., “climbing up a slope”
instead of “taking off magically into nothingness”).
Each target figure was given a linguistic label (in Dutch), either
animate (e.g., padvinder “boy scout”) or inanimate (e.g., steen
“stone”). The animate and inanimate labels were matched (across
items) for frequency and number of characters. The complete list
of lexical labels can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The
competitors had no labels. In each trial, the target figure was pre-
sented just before the start of the animation along with its label
(Figure 1A). To make repeated references possible, each animation
consisted of three “episodes.” First, the target figure performed
an intransitive action (Figure 1B). Here, the target figure moved
either in an animate way or in an inanimate way. Animate move-
ments were suggested by simulating self-propelled actions (e.g.,
climbing up a slope), using cues such as changes in speed or
direction (Tremoulet and Feldman, 2000). The animate move-
ments used were: moving back and forth horizontally across the
screen at varying speeds (two animations); jumping up and down
irregularly; hopping back and forth across the screen with varying
intervals (two animations); moving up a slope with a pause just
before the top; moving diagonally up across the screen in small
steps; making irregular arc-shaped movements across the screen.
Inanimate movements were suggested by creating the impression
that they were caused by an external (invisible) force such as gravity
(e.g., rolling down a slope; Gelman et al., 1995). Since we wanted
to keep implicit what set the object in motion, inanimate move-
ments necessarily started off-screen. The inanimate movements
FIGURE 1 | Example of an incongruent stimulus item in Experiment 1,
with the target figure moving in an animate manner, but having the
inanimate lexical label steen “stone.”The four frames (A–D) are stills
taken from a continuous animation. Letters indicate order; arrows indicate
movement. Both were not shown in the experiment.
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used were: moving across the screen at a constant speed (i.e., as if
sliding on ice; two animations); bouncing vertically several times
with loss of energy; bouncing once (two animations); rolling down
a slope; whirling from top to bottom; moving down and up the
slopes of a valley with loss of energy.
Second, the competitor figures entered the screen,and the target
figure performed a transitive action [interaction with competitor
figures (Figure 1C)]. Animate movements included: colliding with
the competitors from rest; jumping on and off the competitors
(two animations); pushing the competitors away (two anima-
tions); quickly jumping up and down in front of the competitors
(as if startled); bumping into the competitors; briefly touching the
competitors. Inanimate movements included: colliding with the
competitors and bouncing back (two animations); land on top of
the competitors (three animations); colliding with the competi-
tors and pushing them away (two animations); bouncing over the
competitors. The competitors were included to allow alternating
syntactic structures (e.g., “the stone hits the two hikers” vs. “the
two hikers are hit by the stone”), as well as to encourage reference
switches, which should lead to variation in referring expression
use (both pronouns and full noun phrases). They appeared in
dyads, such that pronominal references to the target or the com-
petitors were likely to be unambiguous (singular vs. plural). The
only movement that the competitors made was sliding into the
screen (either from the left or the right). Since this movement was
not particularly animate or inanimate, the perceptual animacy of
the competitors remained ambiguous. The target figure always
appeared before the competitors, to make it a likely candidate for
the discourse topic. To control for agency, the target figure was
always the agent in the transitive action, both in the animate and
in the inanimate conditions.
Finally, the target figure performed another intransitive action
(Figure 1D). Animate movements included: (quickly) moving off
the screen from rest (four animations); hopping off the screen
from rest; rolling down the slope, off the screen; quickly hopping or
stepping down diagonally, off the screen (two animations). Inani-
mate movements included: moving off the screen; being bounced
off the screen; landing on the ground while turning on its axis
(three animations); bouncing back and coming to a rest (three
animations).
The animations (without the lexical labels) were pretested for
perceived animacy of the target referent in a perception study.
Eight participants were asked to rate the target referent in each of
the animations for animacy on a seven-point Likert scale, with
one being “clearly lifeless” and seven being “clearly alive” (cf.
Tremoulet and Feldman, 2000). Ratings were given for each ani-
mation as a whole, not for each movement separately. The results
confirmed that animations intended to be animate were scored sig-
nificantly higher (M anim= 5.13; M inan= 2.53; One-way ANOVA:
F(1,126)= 114.48, p< 0.001, MSE= 1.88).
Procedure
The participants were seated at a table, facing the experiment
leader, who sat in a chair facing the participant. The experiment
was presented on a laptop, which was on the table at an angle with
the participant. The participants’ task was to retell the animations
to the experiment leader. Before each animation, the target figure
was presented in the middle of the screen, accompanied by its lex-
ical label. The target figure and the label were then replaced by a
crosshair, after which the animation started. Participants watched
each animation twice, so that they could accurately retell them
from memory. They were not allowed to start talking when the
animation was still running, because this may have caused them to
skip over crucial information. The participants were instructed to
use the label presented in the beginning when mentioning the tar-
get figure. (Of course, participants were allowed to pronominalize
referents. Although it was not instructed explicitly, all partici-
pants did this.) The competitors could be referred to in any way
they wanted. To ensure lively retellings, participants were further
instructed to retell the animations“in a fanciful manner,as if telling
it to a child.” The experiment started with three practice trials,
after which any remaining questions could be asked. The exper-
iment leader gave only minimal feedback during the experiment
(e.g., nodding or saying “Okay” after each trial; in a few cases the
participant received some encouragement to start talking). There
were no further interactions between participant and experiment
leader while the experiment was running. It took about 25 min to
complete the experiment.
Design
Crossing the factors lexical animacy and perceptual animacy
resulted in a 2 (lexically animate, lexically inanimate)× 2 (percep-
tually animate, perceptually inanimate) within-participants and
within-items design. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of four lists, which were created such that from a given item each
condition occurred on a different list. The items were presented in
a random order. The same order was used across all lists.
Data coding and statistical analyses
The data from one participant were discarded, because this person
retold the animations while watching them instead of afterward.
The data from the other participants were coded by the first author.
Uncertainties were resolved through discussion with the other
authors. First, all stories were divided into fragments contain-
ing descriptions of the three episodes (initial intransitive action,
transitive action, and final intransitive action). We focused on the
descriptions of the transitive action, since these were the fragments
that were expected to show most variation in choice of referent for
the subject position and choice of referring expression. Next, the
fragments were coded for whether the target figure was made the
subject of the critical clause (referent choice), and whether the tar-
get figure was referred to using attenuated expressions (choice of
referring expression). We coded all grammatical subjects of both
main and subordinate clauses as “subject,” and everything else was
coded as “object.” We defined attenuated expressions as all refer-
ring expressions that were not full noun phrases. These included
full pronouns (e.g., zij “she”), reduced pronouns (e.g., ze “she”),
demonstrative pronouns (e.g., die “that one”), and zero anaphora
(e.g., . . . en Ø springt over twee huizen “. . . and Ø jumps over two
houses”). Henceforth, we will use the term “pronoun” to refer to
all these types of referring expressions. If there was more than one
clause describing the action, we only coded the first one. Trials in
which the transitive action was not described were excluded from
analysis. In addition, we excluded trials in which reference was
www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 154 | 5
Vogels et al. Perceptual animacy in referential choices
made to a person or object that was not present in the animation,
since this could have altered the interpretation of the referent’s
animacy, as well as its discourse accessibility. Finally, we excluded
trials in which the target figure was referred to with an indefinite
NP (generally used in contexts where a pronoun is not possible),
referred to with a proper noun (typically used for animate refer-
ents),or not referred to at all. In all,96 cases (19.0%) were removed.
We controlled for discourse salience by coding whether the target
figure was mentioned in the sentence directly preceding the clause
under consideration, and if so, in what grammatical function.
We analyzed the data using logit mixed models (Jaeger, 2008).
Lexical animacy and perceptual animacy were included as fixed
factors; participants and items were included as random factors.
Fixed factors were centered to reduce collinearity. Two analyses
were carried out: one on the log odds of a subject reference, and
one on the log odds of a pronoun reference. Starting with the full
random effect specification, we omitted random slopes that did
not significantly affect the model’s fit using model comparison.
We present only the final models.
RESULTS
Choice of referent
Figure 2 shows the proportion of references to the target figure
as the subject of the clause describing the transitive action. Lex-
ically animate target figures were mentioned as the subject in
91.0% of the cases, whereas lexically inanimate target figures
were mentioned as the subject in 80.7% of the cases. The
effect of lexical animacy on choice of referent was significant,
β= 0.93, SE= 0.31,p< 0.01. We found no effect of perceptual ani-
macy, β= 0.29, SE= 0.32, p= 0.37, and no interaction, β= 0.28,
SE= 0.62, p= 0.65. Random slopes were not included, since they
did not improve the model’s fit2.
To examine whether the effect of lexical animacy was con-
founded by the salience of the target figure in the discourse,
we performed separate analyses for the cases in which the ref-
erent was mentioned in the directly preceding sentence (n= 284),
and for the cases in which the referent was not mentioned in
the directly preceding sentence (n= 124)3. The results, presented
2It is conceivable that the effect of lexical animacy is due to relative animacy of the
target and competitors rather than target animacy alone. Since participants were
free to refer to the competitor objects in any way they wanted, we did not manipu-
late competitor animacy systematically. However, to check whether relative animacy
could have affected our results, we coded whether participants used animate or inan-
imate lexical items to refer to the competitor objects. We omitted an additional 10
observations in which the animacy of the competitors was unclear. Adding competi-
tor animacy as a factor to the model revealed a main effect of competitor animacy:
the target was less likely to be mentioned as the subject when the competitors were
lexically animate (72.7%; n= 150) than when they were lexically inanimate (94.4%;
n= 248), β=−2.28, SE= 0.42, p< 0.001. The main effect of target lexical animacy
remained, β= 1.43, SE= 0.46, p< 0.01, and target perceptual animacy remained
non-significant, β= 0.33, SE= 0.48, p= 0.50. There were no interactions between
target and competitor animacy, suggesting that target animacy affects mention as
subject independently from competitor animacy.
3Although the grammatical function of the referent in the previous sentence is an
important factor in determining whether it will be the subject of the next sentence
(e.g., Grosz et al., 1995), we did not distinguish between different grammatical func-
tions here, since there were only a few cases in which the referent was mentioned as
something else than the subject (3.7%). Repeating the analysis using a distinction
between subject references and everything else yielded similar results.
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion of subject references to the target figure in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 1, by its lexical and
perceptual animacy.
in Figure 3, show that the effect of lexical animacy only holds
when the referent was not mentioned in the previous sentence
(discourse non-salient), β= 1.07, SE= 0.45, p< 0.05. The dif-
ference between lexically animate and inanimate referents that
were discourse salient was not significant, β= 0.74, SE= 0.45,
p= 0.10. Again, perceptual animacy was non-significant in both
data sets, β= 0.42, SE= 0.47, p= 0.37 and β= 0.30, SE= 0.46,
p= 0.52, respectively; interactions: β= 0.70, SE= 0.91, p= 0.44
and β=−0.03, SE= 0.91, p= 0.97, respectively.
Choice of referring expression
Figure 4 shows the overall proportion of pronoun (i.e., non-full
NP) references to the target figure in the description of the tran-
sitive action. This includes both subject and object pronouns.
Lexically animate referents were referred to with pronouns in
86.0% of the cases, against 78.6% for lexically inanimate referents.
The effect of lexical animacy was significant, β= 0.58, SE= 0.28,
p< 0.05. In addition, perceptually animate referents were referred
to with pronouns in 85.5% of the cases, against 79.6% for per-
ceptually inanimate referents. Although this effect was just slightly
smaller than that of lexical animacy, it was only marginally sig-
nificant, β= 0.48, SE= 0.28, p= 0.09. We found no interaction
between lexical and perceptual animacy, β=−0.22, SE= 0.55,
p= 0.69. Random slopes were not included, since they did not
contribute to the model’s fit4.
4Again, we conducted an analysis in which we included competitor animacy in the
model. The effect of competitor animacy was marginally significant, β=−0.53,
SE= 0.32, p= 0.09, with slightly fewer pronominalized target referents when the
competitors were lexically animate (80.7%; n= 150) than lexically inanimate
(83.5%; n= 248). The significant effect of target lexical animacy remained,β= 0.71,
SE= 0.29, p< 0.05, as did the marginally significant effect of target perceptual ani-
macy, β= 0.53, SE= 0.30, p= 0.07. There were no interactions between target and
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of subject references to the target figure in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 1, by its lexical and
perceptual animacy, and split by the discourse salience of the referent:
mentioned in the directly preceding sentence (discourse salient, left
pane), or not mentioned in the directly preceding sentence (discourse
non-salient, right pane).
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FIGURE 4 | Proportion of pronoun references to the target in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 1, by its lexical and
perceptual animacy.
To investigate whether these effects were confounded with the
referent’s discourse salience, we performed two separate analy-
ses, one for the cases in which the referent was mentioned
in the directly preceding sentence (n= 284), and one for the
cases in which it was not mentioned (n= 124). The results,
presented in Figure 5, show that when the referent was dis-
course salient (i.e., mentioned in the previous sentence), no effects
of animacy were present (lexical animacy: β= 0.90, SE= 0.60,
competitor animacy. This suggests that target lexical animacy affects pronoun use
independently from competitor lexical animacy.
p= 0.14; perceptual animacy: β= 0.31, SE= 0.62, p= 0.62; inter-
action: β=−0.05, SE= 1.20, p= 0.97). However, when the ref-
erent was discourse non-salient (i.e., not mentioned in the pre-
vious sentence), perceptual animacy had a significant effect on
the choice of referring expression, β= 1.35, SE= 0.47, p< 0.01:
more pronouns were used when the referent was perceptually
animate. The effect of lexical animacy was no longer signif-
icant, β= 0.66, SE= 0.46, p= 0.15, suggesting that this factor
may indeed be partly confounded with discourse salience (i.e.,
what is lexically animate is also more likely to be the subject,
cf. Figure 2). There was no interaction, β=−0.58, SE= 0.91,
p= 0.52.
We also investigated whether the grammatical function of the
referent in the current sentence showed the same confound. To
this end, we performed separate analyses on referring expressions
in subject position (n= 352) and non-subject position (n= 56).
The results, presented in Figure 6, showed a significant effect of
perceptual animacy on the choice of referring expression in sub-
ject position, β= 0.89, SE= 0.34, p< 0.01: more pronouns were
used when the referent was perceptually animate. There was no
effect of lexical animacy, β= 0.22, SE= 0.34, p= 0.51, and no
interaction, β=−0.91, SE= 0.68, p= 0.18. Although Figure 6
suggests an effect of perceptual animacy in the opposite direc-
tion in non-subject position, this was not significant, β=−0.82,
SE= 0.69, p= 0.24. The same held for lexical animacy, β= 0.99,
SE= 0.67, p= 0.14. There was no interaction, β= 0.67, SE= 1.33,
p= 0.62. Again, these patterns suggest a confound of discourse
salience/grammatical function with lexical animacy, but not with
perceptual animacy.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 showed differential effects of the two
types of animacy manipulations. Firstly, in descriptions of the
transitive event in the animations, which involved an interaction
between the target figure and the two competitor figures, the target
figure’s lexical animacy, but not its perceptual animacy, influenced
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FIGURE 5 | Proportion of pronoun references to the target figure in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 1, by its lexical and
perceptual animacy, and split by the discourse salience of the referent:
mentioned in the directly preceding sentence (discourse salient, left
pane), or not mentioned in the directly preceding sentence (discourse
non-salient, right pane).
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FIGURE 6 | Proportion of pronoun references to the target figure in the description of the transitive action in Experiment 1, by its lexical and
perceptual animacy, and split by the grammatical function of the referent: subject (left pane), or non-subject (right pane).
whether it was mentioned as the subject of the sentence or not. For
example, participants were more likely to say de padvinder duwt de
pestkoppen weg “the boy scout pushes the bullies away” than they
were to say de steen duwt de pestkoppen weg “the stone pushes the
bullies away” (in which case sentences such as de pestkoppen wor-
den weggeduwd door de steen “the bullies are pushed away by the
stone”were more frequent)5. However, whether it was an animate-
like moving stone (e.g., one trying to climb up a slope) or not did
not matter. In addition, the effects of animacy were only present
when the referent was not mentioned in the previous sentence, sug-
gesting that discourse salience is a stronger factor in determining
which grammatical role is assigned to the referent.
5These examples, as well as those in the next paragraph, were constructed for
illustrative purposes and do not reflect any participant’s exact wordings.
Secondly, the choice of referring expression to refer to the target
figure in the transitive action seemed to be affected by perceptual
animacy: more pronouns were used when referents were moving
in an animate way, independently of their lexical animacy. For
example, participants were more likely to say hij duwt ze weg “it
pushes them away” than they were to say de steen duwt ze weg
“the stone pushes them away,” when the referent was an ani-
mate moving stone. Again, this effect was confined to the cases
in which the referent was discourse non-salient; when the ref-
erent was discourse salient, participants used pronouns almost
exclusively, masking any effects of animacy. In addition, the effect
of perceptual animacy was also confined to the cases in which
the referent was the subject of the current sentence, suggest-
ing that the environments in which perceptual animacy becomes
relevant are cases of topic shift. Although pronominalization of
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lexically animate referents was also somewhat more frequent than
pronominalization of lexically inanimate referents, this difference
was not significant when controlling for discourse salience, sug-
gesting that the effect of lexical animacy may be partly indirect, i.e.,
lexically animate referents are more likely to be subjects, and this
in turn increases pronoun use. These findings show that the choice
of referring expression can be influenced by factors induced by the
non-linguistic context, such as perceptual animacy. Surprisingly,
the effect of perceptual animacy was equally large in the lexically
animate and lexically inanimate condition, suggesting that lexically
animate referents can as easily be conceptualized as inanimate as
lexically inanimate referents can be conceptualized as animate.
In Experiment 1, we tried to manipulate perceptual and lexical
animacy independently. The results suggest that the two factors
affect choice of referent and choice of referring expression differ-
ently. In the choice of referring expression, perceptual animacy
seems to be a stronger cue for accessibility than lexical animacy, at
least when discourse salience is low. Although lexical animacy does
not seem to be completely overruled, this finding is in line with
Nieuwland and van Berkum’s (2006) findings that in case of a con-
flict between the two factors, perceptual animacy gets prevalence.
Thus, a stone that is trying to climb up a slope is assigned animacy
because of its animate-like movements. In the choice of referent
for the subject position, however, only lexical animacy seems to
have an effect.
It is possible, however, that the lexical items influenced percep-
tion in the experiment, and that therefore the two factors were not
independent. For example, while an animation of a circle bounc-
ing in a very regular manner is likely to be interpreted as inanimate
movement (a bouncing ball), calling the circle a “prince” may
encourage the viewer to find an interpretation of the movement
that matches the animacy of the lexical item. In this example, one
could come up with a story about a prince jumping on a trampo-
line (and some participants did). Similarly, a circle trying to climb
up a slope might look very animate-like, but calling the circle a
“stone” may cause the viewer to come up with an interpretation
in which the stone was pushed with such force that it could with-
stand gravity and roll upward. This makes it unclear whether the
factor perceptual animacy really measured what it should measure,
namely the impression of animacy people would get from purely
perceptual features, i.e., movements. Experiment 2 was set up to
deal with this potential complication.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, except that we replaced
the lexical labels by nonsense words. These words were chosen in
such a way to avoid intuitions about the animacy of the word as
much as possible. In this way, we expected to minimize the chance
that the lexical labels would influence the interpretation of the
movements, and to get a clearer picture of the effects of perceptual
animacy on referential choices.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifteen undergraduate students from Tilburg University partici-
pated in this study as speakers. Another 15 naive participants acted
as addressees. Ten speakers and nine addressees participated for
course credit; the others volunteered. All gave their consent to the
use of their data. None of them had participated in Experiment 1.
Materials
The animations were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
However, instead of real words, the lexical labels consisted of non-
sense words. These words were constructed by altering the real
words from Experiment 1, while keeping the length in characters
and the number of syllables the same (e.g., daptinder from pad-
vinder (“boy scout”). Together with a number of real words, these
constructed words were entered into a pretest in which nine par-
ticipants indicated for each word whether they knew the word or
not, and if not, to what degree they thought the word could refer to
a person, an animal, or a thing. Participants marked their answers
on five-point Likert scales (e.g., “very likely a person” to “very
likely NOT a person”). Eight nonsense words that were indicated
as “unknown” by all participants, and had average scores around
the middle of all three scales were selected for the present experi-
ment. As in Experiment 1, they were presented together with the
target figure just before the start of each animation. To ensure that
the labels would be interpreted as nouns referring to the target
figures, the labels were preceded by the phrase dit is een “this is
a.” A list of all nonsense words can be found in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, except that
the addressee for the story retellings was no longer the experi-
ment leader, but another naive participant. This was done to make
the stories even more lively, which should reduce the number of
missing data. To make the task more engaging, we also gave the
addressees a task. For each object described by a nonsense word,
they had to indicate on an answer sheet whether they thought this
object was a person, an animal, or a thing. Because instructions
were only given in written form, the speakers remained unaware
of the nature of this task. Four speaker-addressee couples were
tested in a face-to-face setting similar to that in Experiment 1; the
other 11 couples communicated through Eye Catchers6, because
they were tested directly after another, unrelated, experiment that
used this setup. Instructions were virtually identical to those of
Experiment 1. After two practice trials, the experiment was started
and the experiment leader left the room. It took about 20 min to
complete the experiment.
Design
Since lexical animacy was held constant in this experiment by using
nonsense words, the only independent variable was perceptual
animacy. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two lists,
6See http://www.qconferencing.eu. Communication through Eye Catchers resem-
bles face-to-face communication, because users can have direct eye contact (cf. Mol
et al., 2011). Any effects of communication medium should not influence the results,
since the use of Eye Catchers was counterbalanced across the animate and inani-
mate conditions. In addition, participants did see each other in person before the
experiment and were experienced in using Eye Catchers due to the unrelated exper-
iment that directly preceded the presently discussed experiment. Removing the four
participants that communicated face-to-face from the analysis did not change the
results.
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which were created such that from a given item the perceptually
animate version occurred on one list, and the perceptually inani-
mate version on the other. Items were presented in a random order.
The same order was used in the two lists.
Data coding and statistical analyses
The coding scheme and the procedure for statistical analysis were
identical to that of Experiment 1. We excluded six cases (5.0%)
because either the transitive action was not described, or the given
lexical label was not used.
RESULTS
Choice of referent
Figure 7 shows the proportion of references to the target figure as
the subject of the clause describing the transitive action as a func-
tion of perceptual animacy. Target referents were made the subject
of the sentence in the great majority of the cases (perceptually ani-
mate referents: 96.5%; perceptually inanimate referents: 93.0%).
There was no significant effect of perceptual animacy, β= 0.95,
SE= 1.03, p= 0.36. Random slopes were not included, since they
did not improve the model’s fit7.
Choice of referring expression
Figure 8 shows the proportion of pronoun references to the target
referent in the descriptions of the transitive action as a function
7Although it was not the aim of this experiment to also investigate effects of discourse
salience, we did perform separate analyses on the two types of context (discourse
salient: referent was mentioned in the directly preceding sentence; n= 75, discourse
non-salient: referent was not mentioned in the directly preceding sentence; n= 39).
However, because the number of observations in each set was too small to support
a mixed model with a full random effects structure, we performed two repeated
measurement ANOVAs on arc-sine transformed proportions of subject references.
These analyses showed no effects of perceptual animacy in either data set: discourse
salient, F1(1,14)= 1.00, p= 0.33; F2(1,7)= 1.00, p= 0.35; discourse non-salient,
F1(1,10)= 0.51, p= 0.49; F2(1,6)= 0.57, p= 0.48.
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FIGURE 7 | Proportion of subject references to the target figure in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 2, by its perceptual
animacy.
of perceptual animacy. Pronouns were used more frequently when
the target referent was perceptually animate (87.7%) than when
it was perceptually inanimate (68.4%). The effect of perceptual
animacy was significant, β= 1.31, SE= 0.52, p< 0.05. Random
slopes were not included, since they did not improve the model’s
fit8.
DISCUSSION
The aim of Experiment 2 was to exclude the possibility that the
perceived animacy of referents is influenced by the animacy of
their lexical descriptions. By using nonsense words for which peo-
ple have no strong intuitions about animacy, we controlled for
this possible influence. The results largely confirmed the results of
Experiment 1. An effect of perceptual animacy was found on the
choice of referring expression in the descriptions of the transitive
action. Here, perceptually animate referents were more likely to be
pronominalized than perceptually inanimate referents. As before,
perceptual animacy did not affect the choice of whether the ref-
erent was placed in subject position. These findings again suggest
that perceptual animacy, a factor that is dependent on the visual
context, can influence the choice of referring expression.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to investigate whether perceptual ani-
macy of referents influences referential choices, and how this
8Separate analyses were performed for discourse salient referents (n= 75) and
discourse non-salient referents (n= 39). Repeated measurement ANOVAs (see foot-
note 7) showed a marginally significant effect of perceptual animacy in discourse
salient contexts, F1(1,14)= 4.53, p= 0.05; F2(1,7)= 3.80, p= 0.09. In discourse
non-salient contexts, the effect of perceptual animacy was significant but only over
participants, F1(1,10)= 7.34, p< 0.05; F2(1,6)= 0.20, p= 0.67. In addition, we
investigated whether the effect of animacy held for referring expressions in both sub-
ject and non-subject position. However, there were very few instances of non-subject
expressions referring to the target figure (n= 6). When we omitted these cases
from the analysis, the effect of perceptual animacy remained significant, β= 1.09,
SE= 0.53, p< 0.05.
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FIGURE 8 | Proportion of pronoun references to the target figure in the
description of the transitive action in Experiment 2, by its perceptual
animacy.
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interacts with lexical animacy. Firstly, the results of Experiment
1 confirm that lexical animacy affects the choice of referent for the
subject position: lexically animate referents were more likely to be
mentioned as the subject of a transitive sentence. This is in line
with research indicating that animacy affects grammatical func-
tion assignment (Bock et al., 1992; McDonald et al., 1993; Dahl
and Fraurud, 1996). The effect was confined to contexts in which
the referent was not discourse salient, suggesting that discourse
salience may overrule effects of animacy (cf. Prat-Sala and Brani-
gan, 2000). Perceptual animacy, on the other hand, did not seem
to influence the choice of referent for the subject position, even
when lexical cues for animacy were not present (Experiment 2).
This suggests that visual cues can be overridden by lexical cues,
which is not what would be predicted under the assumption that
derived accessibility can override inherent accessibility.
Secondly, lexical animacy influenced the choice of referring
expression: also in line with previous research (Dahl and Frau-
rud, 1996; Yamamoto, 1999; Fukumura and van Gompel, 2011),
lexically animate referents were more frequently pronominalized,
although this effect might be partly mediated by grammatical
function. More importantly, the results of both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 show that in addition to lexical animacy, percep-
tual animacy also affects pronominalization. This supports the
hypothesis that both cues for animacy affect a referent’s con-
ceptual accessibility. As predicted, perceptual animacy turned
out to be a stronger factor in determining the choice of refer-
ring expression than lexical animacy, at least for discourse non-
salient referents. This suggests that in this case visual cues can
override lexical cues, in line with the idea that derived accessi-
bility can override inherent accessibility. This is also consistent
with Nieuwland and Van Berkum (2006), who found that con-
textual cues overruled lexical-semantic cues in comprehension.
Surprisingly, in our study this does not only hold for lexically
inanimate objects, which can be conceptualized as animate in
a certain context, but also for lexically animate entities, which
seem to become less animate when they move in an inanimate
way.
While our materials were abstract, people readily conceptual-
ized objects as more animate or more inanimate based on motion
cues, as was already shown in the animacy pretest. That partici-
pants easily accommodated their conceptualizations of objects to
the perceptual context, independently of their lexical animacy, can
also be seen from the way the objects were described in Experiment
1. For example, lamps and snowflakes were described as “happy”
or “afraid,” and a handbag “tries” or “decides” to go in a certain
direction. Conversely, there were some indications that lexically
animate objects were conceptualized as inanimate. Besides the use
of predicates that are associated (but not exclusively) with inan-
imate movement, such as “fall,” “bounce,” and “slide,” there were
also a few cases in which objects were referred to with pronouns
of which the gender did not match with the noun (e.g., using hij
“he,”“it” to refer to a queen). Although these cases might be errors,
they were confined to the lexically animate-perceptually inanimate
condition, suggesting that conceptual information associated with
the lexical item was overruled by a different conceptualization.
However, given the gradual nature of animacy (Comrie, 1989),
most objects were probably conceptualized as neither fully animate
nor fully inanimate, both in the experiment and in the animacy
pretest. The crucial point is, however, that manipulating motion
alone made some objects appear more animate than others, and
the same manipulation also affected pronoun use. Hence, objects
that were statistically more likely to be conceptualized as animate
were statistically more likely to be pronominalized.
These results have several theoretical implications. First of all,
they suggest that which entity becomes the subject of the sentence
is affected by the animacy of the lexical items, but not by the con-
ceptualization of the entity based on perceptual cues. This seems
inconsistent with a conceptual accessibility account of lineariza-
tion (e.g., Bock and Warren, 1985; Prat-Sala and Branigan, 2000;
Van Nice and Dietrich, 2003a). According to such an account,
it is the conceptual (rather than the lexical) accessibility of ani-
mate entities that causes them to be mentioned earlier in the
sentence (either through a direct link to word order, or indirectly
via grammatical function). Consequently, a lexically inanimate
entity that is conceptualized as animate, such as a stone climb-
ing up a slope should also be more accessible according to this
account. However, others have linked conceptual accessibility to
the retrieval of lexical items (Levelt et al., 1999; Branigan et al.,
2008). According to Levelt et al. (1999), there is a close connection
between concepts, lemmas, and word forms. When a concept is
highly accessible, this speeds up lemma retrieval, and, assuming
incremental sentence production, the corresponding lexical item
is produced first. This might explain the dominance of lexical ani-
macy in referent choice. A crucial factor here might be the nature
of the task. In our experiments, the lexical labels were presented
before the start of the animations. Therefore, in Experiment 1 the
concepts associated with the lexical items were already activated
before any conceptualizations on the basis of perceptual cues were
made. Hence, any contextually induced conceptualizations could
have been overruled by the animacy of the activated lemmas when
participants mentioned the referents. Our results might therefore
have been different if we had presented the lexical labels after the
animations.
In addition, Van Nice and Dietrich (2003b) found that when
participants described pictures that remained in view, the ani-
macy of the agent and the animacy of the patient both affected
the rate of passivization, but there were no interactions between
the two factors, suggesting that speakers were not actively com-
paring properties of different entities. However, when they had
the participants describe the pictures from memory, they did find
an interaction. Van Nice and Dietrich attributed this effect to
“compressed” processing of entities, such that entities would be
processed almost simultaneously in this task, whereas they would
have been processed serially when participants had more pro-
cessing time. Similarly, they argued that the interaction between
discourse salience and animacy found by Prat-Sala and Brani-
gan (2000) [i.e., context may overrule effects of (lexical) animacy]
could be due to the fact that information about both factors was
already present before participants started speaking, also leading
to compressed processing. However, while in our experiments all
information about the referents was also given before the partic-
ipants started speaking, we did not find an interaction between
target and competitor animacy (see footnote 2). In addition, while
we did not present any linguistic context before the participants
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started speaking, we did find evidence that discourse context over-
ruled animacy effects. More research is needed to investigate how
choices in language production are affected by the nature of the
task.
A second implication of our findings is that the choice of refer-
ring expression can be influenced by non-linguistic, perceptual
information. This is unexpected under an account in which the
choice of referring expression is only determined by local discourse
factors, such as givenness, grammatical function, and topichood
(e.g., Ariel, 1990; Gundel et al., 1993; Grosz et al., 1995; Steven-
son, 2002; Kehler et al., 2008). As also found by Fukumura and
van Gompel (2011), the inherent accessibility of referents can
influence the choice of referring expression. Our results extend
this finding by showing that it is not just an effect of conceptual
representations associated with lexical items. Rather, it involves
a level of non-linguistic representation (e.g., Bock and Warren,
1985; Arnold, 2010), which may be shaped by perceptual proper-
ties, such as an object’s movements. This also means that although
animacy effects have been attributed to inherent accessibility,
i.e., accessibility based on intrinsic properties of a (lexical) con-
cept, these effects are also dependent on the (perceptual) context,
and hence are partly driven by derived accessibility. It remains
an open question whether such non-linguistic, perception-based
representations should always be activated in linguistic tasks, or
primarily play a role in cases of violations of canonical animacy
such as in the present study. However, there is evidence that they
are relevant also in more “everyday” language use (see Rosen-
bach, 2008 for an overview). In addition, our finding that even
lexically animate entities may be treated as less animate in ref-
erence when their movements appear less animate might suggest
that our results are not just due to the participants’ familiarity
with cartoons or fairy tales, in which this kind of animacy shift
is rare.
Combining our two main findings, a pattern emerges that
seems contradictory: whereas a referent’s perceptual animacy can
override lexical animacy in determining the choice of referring
expression, this does not happen in the choice of referent for
the subject position. This is not in line with accounts of refer-
ent accessibility in which the choice of referent for first mention
and the choice of referring expression are both dependent on the
conceptual accessibility of mental representations (e.g., Arnold,
2008, 2010). For example, in her Expectancy Hypothesis, Arnold
(2008) proposes that accessibility is a catchall term for different
factors that correlate with the probability that an entity will be
mentioned again. However, the present results suggest that the
different cues for animacy cannot easily be gathered under this
single term. Other researchers have suggested that choice of refer-
ring expression and choice of referent for first mention should be
dissociated (e.g., Stevenson et al., 1994; Kehler et al., 2008). Typ-
ically, a distinction is made between bottom-up factors, such as
grammatical function and information structure, and top-down
factors, such as coherence, discourse topicality, and general expec-
tations about what will happen next. The choice of referring
expression is assumed to be affected by bottom-up factors, sim-
ilar to Centering (Gordon et al., 1993; Grosz et al., 1995), while
the likelihood that an entity will be mentioned next is affected by
top-down factors. However, our finding that perceptual animacy
influences the rate of pronominalization might also seem hard to
reconcile with this account. Perceptual animacy can be regarded
as a top-down factor, since it is dependent on context rather
than linguistic properties. By analogy with other top-down fac-
tors such as coherence, perceptual animacy should be expected
to affect likelihood of next mention, but not choice of referring
expression.
An explanation for the apparent contradiction may lie in the
task-dependent effects outlined above. While the choice of refer-
ent and the choice of referring expression may both be influenced
by the referent’s extra-linguistic conceptual accessibility, in the
case of choosing a referent for the subject position this process
may receive competition from the animacy of the lexical items
when these are already given. That is, the presentation of a lex-
ical item activates the corresponding lexical concept, which may
boost the speed of retrieval of the lexical item in production (e.g.,
Bock and Irwin, 1980). This boost may be larger in the case of
an animate concept. Hence, the quick retrieval of animate lex-
ical items may make them more likely to be placed in subject
position, even when the referent is conceptualized as inanimate
due to the perceptual context. The choice of referring expres-
sion, on the other hand, is less dependent on the speed of lexical
retrieval. Although it has been found that lexical information
from the antecedent noun is activated when retrieving a pronoun
(e.g., Meyer and Bock, 1999; Schmitt et al., 1999), the choice of
whether or not to use a pronoun in the first place can probably be
made directly on the basis of the non-linguistic conceptual rep-
resentation of an entity. Hence, this choice may be more driven
by accessibility derived from perceptual cues than the choice of
referent.
However, since we investigated the number of subject refer-
ences, and not first mention per se, we cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that perceptual animacy does have an effect on linearization
independently of grammatical function, as has been suggested
by several studies (e.g., Branigan and Feleki, 1999; Prat-Sala and
Branigan, 2000; Christianson and Ferreira, 2005; Branigan et al.,
2008). Whereas Dutch, the language of our experiments, has a
relatively free word order, and thus allows for the investigation
of linearization independently of grammatical function, our data
were not structured enough to analyze this. For example, as we
were dealing with relatively spontaneous speech, most of our
selected clauses were not clear-cut sentences, which makes it hard
to determine where exactly sentences begin. Therefore, we did not
further pursue these analyses, and we will leave this issue to future
research.
Still, it is not clear how our finding that perceptual animacy
affects rate of pronominalization would be accounted for in mod-
els of language production. It could be argued that this effect is
mediated by other factors, such as information structure or agency.
For example, animate entities may be more likely to be topics (e.g.,
Givón, 1983). Hence, it might be the case that perceptually ani-
mate entities are more likely to be pronominalized because they
are topics. This explanation would be in line with a Centering-
type account. However, this is not a likely explanation. Firstly,
we have seen that the effects of perceptual animacy remained
intact when we controlled for discourse salience. Although enti-
ties that had been mentioned in the previous clause were likely
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to be pronominalized, entities that had not been mentioned (and
thus were not likely topics) were more likely to be pronominalized
when they were perceptually animate. Secondly, the target referent
was always presented just before each animation, and it was also
the first entity to appear in the screen at the start of each anima-
tion. We assume that this made all target referents equally likely
candidates for the discourse topic across the conditions.
As for agency, this is another factor that is likely to affect a refer-
ent’s conceptual accessibility (e.g., Van Nice and Dietrich, 2003b),
but it is hard to disentangle it from animacy, since agents are
often animate. In our experiments, we kept the agency of the
objects constant in the sense that it was always the target figure
that moved in the episode of interest (the transitive action), while
the competitors remained still. Thus, although the mere fact that
the objects moved might already have increased their conceptual
accessibility, this was at least the same for both the animate and
the inanimate moving objects. However, a valid argument against
this is that agency is itself a gradient notion (e.g., Dowty, 1991).
That is, the inanimate movements in our experiments may have
been inherently less agentive than the animate movements. Dowty
(1991) proposed an entailment hierarchy of agentivity, in which
entities are considered more agentive the more properties of a
prototypical agent they possess. The hierarchy is headed by the
proto-agent properties volition (i.e., having a will) and sentience
(i.e., being conscious, being able to perceive), both of which entail
animacy. On this view, we cannot exclude the possibility that our
perceptually animate objects were also more prototypical agents
than our perceptually inanimate objects. Since it would be diffi-
cult to completely disentangle perceptual animacy from perceptual
agency by using motion alone, future studies could find different
ways of manipulating perceptual animacy to tease these two factors
apart.
These issues notwithstanding, the present study has shown
that referential choices in Dutch can be influenced by factors
that go beyond the linguistic context, and may even be percep-
tual in nature. We have focused on the interaction between two
sources of animacy, and although many studies have shown that
animacy is not reducible to an epiphenomenon of some other
accessibility-related factor, it is clear that it interacts with many
other factors (e.g., Comrie, 1989; Van Nice and Dietrich, 2003a;
Rosenbach, 2008). Future research should investigate more inter-
actions between accessibility-related factors in referential choices,
especially between linguistic and perceptual factors, and between
discourse-related and referent-intrinsic factors, possibly also using
more online measures such as eye movements.
In summary, the present study provides evidence for differen-
tial effects of perceptual and lexical cues for animacy on referential
choices. Perceptual animacy appeared to overrule lexical animacy
in the choice of referring expression, extending previous findings.
On the other hand, the choice of referent for the subject position
appeared to be affected only by lexical animacy. The results raise
new questions about the nature of animacy effects on referential
choices in particular and of accessibility in general.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Lexical items used in Experiment 1.
Animate Inanimate
schaatser “skater” handtas “handbag”
prins “prince” voetbal “football”
peuter “toddler” schoen “shoe”
visser “fisherman” fles “bottle”
padvinder “boy scout” steen “stone”
koningin “queen” sneeuwvlok “snowflake”
danseres “(female) dancer” lamp “lamp”
boef “scoundrel” eierdoos “egg carton”
Table A2 | Nonsense words used in Experiment 2.
daptinder
knurp
kilper
vopper
pundimper
sloeiweurd
krielf
etalbuns
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